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The Devil in the Details 
Robert Darnton 
 
  Anyone who has labored on a large-scale book knows the feeling: after spending 
years in relative isolation—what I think of as the loneliness of the long-distance writer—
you arrive at the finish line and ask: Will anyone notice?  I feel gratified and grateful that 
the four contributors to this issue of H-France Forum have not only paid careful attention 
to the arguments in The Devil in the Holy Water but have also developed counter-
arguments of their own.  I would like to group their criticism under four rubrics and use 
my answers to clarify what I intended to argue in my book. 
 
Historiography.  Darnton failed to take account of interpretations developed by other 
historians and to answer their objections to his.  He places himself au-dessus de la mêlée.   
 
          True, I did not begin the book with a survey of the literature on similar subjects.  
Monographs, especially converted doctoral dissertations, usually begin in this manner, 
but I made a carefully considered decision not to do so and not to open my argument as I 
have done in previous books, because I was attempting to argue in a different mode.  I 
began with visual material, four frontispieces, which I hoped would strike the reader’s 
eye in such a way as to provoke a question—the question that Erving Goffman 
purportedly recommended as the starting point for any investigation: What is going on 
here?  Goffman’s capacity to decipher meanings behind appearances inspired my 
approach to my subject.  The frontispieces lead the reader into the texts of four libels, and 
the libels interlock in ways that reveal a great deal about their respective authors.  To 
make my purpose clear, I had proposed to set off this visual preface with a sub-title page, 
“Four Frontispieces in Search of an Author.”  The publisher vetoed that idea, but I think 
the iconography was striking enough by itself to evoke the strangeness of these works—
that is, their sheer opacity from the viewpoint of a modern reader.  Libels from the 
eighteenth century may look simple, but they need to be decoded.  They draw on 
rhetorical conventions and cultural presuppositions that are foreign to the modern mind.  I 
set out to capture their alien idiom, working in the manner of an anthropologist.  I wanted 
to survey the entire corpus of libel literature, to show how the texts played on eighteenth-
century sensibilities, and to tease out implications for an understanding of the mental 
world of the reading public. 
  Instead of discoursing on historiography, therefore, I chose a point of entry into 
my subject that was unabashedly hermeneutical.  My critics generally ignored this aspect 
of The Devil in the Holy Water, although Geoffrey Turnovsky picked up on my concern 
with rhetoric and typography, and Darrin McMahon noted that I rely on a concept of 
elective affinity rather than causality.  Had I begun the book with a discourse on method, 
my approach could have been clearer; and had I supplied a historiographical introduction, 
my readers could have seen how my argument differs from that of others.  My reluctance 
to launch a narrative by clearing a way through other narratives may be temperamental or 
a matter of taste or perhaps even an aversion contracted during my graduate work in   2 
Oxford.  When I read my first essay on the French Revolution to my tutor, Harry Pitt of 
Worcester College, I began with a harangue about causality.  I had spent the previous 
semester at Harvard studying the Critique of Pure Reason, and I thought I knew what a 
cause was.  When I finally reached the events of 1787 and 1788, I sensed that Harry had 
been sinking deeper and deeper into his armchair.  And when I finally stopped, a voice 
from far down in the armchair said, “Why don’t you remove the scaffolding and leave the 
building standing?” 
  By leaving theoretical and historiographical considerations implicit, I meant no 
disrespect to other historians.  I have a high regard for the work of Keith Baker, Thomas 
Kaiser, Dale Van Kley, Jeremy Popkin, David Garioch, Daniel Roche, Roger Chartier, 
Jacques Revel, Arlette Farge, Chantal Thomas, Olivier Ferret, and many others not 
mentioned by McMahon, including former students of mine such as Sarah Maza, David 
Bell, Carla Hesse, Jeffrey Freedman, Laura Mason, Thierry Rigogne, Charles Walton, 
and Will Slauter, who have dealt with subjects related to those of The Devil in the Holy 
Water.  But I chose to plunge right into my subject, in Goffmanesque fashion, rather than 
to walk around it, surveying the surrounding literature.  That task, I believe, can best be 
left to reviewers such as McMahon himself, who has provided a fair and valid discussion 
of my work and has extended it in new directions.
1 
 
Reading.  Darnton failed in the crucial task of explaining how libels were read. 
 
  All of my critics raise this objection, and I confess that I do not have a satisfactory 
answer to it.  Not only is it impossible to get into the minds of readers today, despite the 
advances in the science of cognition and neurology, but there is so little evidence left 
behind by readers from the eighteenth century that any attempt to study reader reception 
may be doomed at the outset.  I believe nonetheless that The Devil in the Holy Water 
makes an important contribution to the history of reading.  To my surprise, my critics 
paid little attention to long sections of the book where I discussed reading practices under 
the ancien régime.  Of course many kinds of reading co-existed—far more than can be 
accommodated in the over-simple formula of a “reading revolution” at the end of the 
century.  But one kind was particularly relevant to the experience of libel literature under 
the ancient régime: reading as decoding, puzzle solving, and the detection of hidden 
meaning. 
  As no one has ever paid attention to this variety of reading, I would like to 
indicate some aspects of my argument that, in my view, deserve to be debated.  By 1750, 
every issue of the Mercure de France, the most widely read periodical of the eighteenth 
century, began with reading puzzles—énigmes, logogryphes, charades, and many more.  
By consulting the Mercure and similar reviews, eighteenth-century readers acquired a 
habit that was described at the time in the figurative phrase, “trouver le mot de l’énigme.”  
They learned to unscramble anagrams, to supply the missing last word of a rhyming 
couplet, to rearrange syllables, to decode rebuses, and in general to decipher texts for 
hidden meanings.  Many libels played on this practice.  Readers had to fill in ellipsis dots, 
compose keys to fictitious names, and puzzle out allusions signaled by devices such as 
facetious footnotes.  “Half of this article is true,” Charles Théveneau de Morande wrote 
teasingly in Le Gazetier cuirassé.  Which half?  It was up to the reader to decide.   3 
  The luddic character of this literature set a tone of playfulness in libels published 
before 1789.  But in amusing readers, libels oriented their readings in a potentially 
dangerous direction, because to solve the puzzle, get the joke, or understand the rebus (as 
in the frontispiece of Le Gazetier cuirassé), the readers had to arrive at a specific 
interpretation.  The hidden character behind the ellipses dots was usually an important 
public figure; and therefore the puzzle solving focused the reader’s attention on a 
politically sensitive target.  Reading in general may have involved a process of 
undetermined braconnage, as Michel de Certeau and Roger Chartier have argued
2, but the 
reading of libels—sometimes, not always—triggered responses that can be reconstructed 
by the historian.  In one copy of Le Diable dans un bénitier I found a manuscript key 
written by a reader who was attempting to decipher the identities of the half-hidden 
characters in the text and succeeded in 20 out of 22 cases—a score that suggests the 
degree of difficulty in the puzzle solving.  What readers ultimately made of the solutions 
to the puzzles is, I admit, a puzzle in itself.  This aspect of my argument may be the most 
vulnerable to criticism, and I hope that others will pursue it further than I did.  I argue 
that the ultimate mot de l’énigme was despotism, but that conclusion rests on my own 
reading of the texts reinforced by a certain amount of literary theory derived from Roland 
Barthes, Wolfgang Iser, Stanley Fish, and others.  Having worked closely with D. F. 
McKenzie, I tried to apply his insights in studying the paratextual, and intertextual 
aspects of libels.  As he argues, bibliography can blend into sociology.  But McKenzie’s 
“sociology of texts” needs to be fleshed out with evidence from social history.
3 
  I drew a great deal of evidence from police archives.  Geoffrey Turnovsky rightly 
warns against the danger of taking police reports literally and cites as an example my 
account of inspector Pierre-Antoine-Auguste Goupil’s investigation of the demoiselle La 
Marche, who sold forbidden literature from a boutique in the Palais-Royal.  In this case, I 
plead innocent.  I did not quote from Goupil’s reports to prove that the fashionable crowd 
gathered at the book stall was a “menacing mass.”  Instead, I used them to illustrate the 
social context of libel consumption and, in particular, what I take to be a key ingredient in 
the formation of public opinion—namely, the combination of reading and talking.  The 
“couple lecture-conversation,” as Laurent Turcot points out, occupies a central place in 
the sociology of Gabriel Tarde, which I oppose to that of Jürgen Habermas.  Tarde’s 
thesis, which anticipates that of Benedict Anderson, is borne out by Louis Sébastien 
Mercier’s descriptions of prerevolutionary Paris.  Mercier emphasized the mutual 
reinforcement of the printed and oral means of communication in several of his works, 
not only in Le Tableau de Paris but particularly in two less familiar but more revealing 
tracts, Les Entretiens du Palais-Royal de Paris (1786) and Les Entretiens du Jardin des 
Tuileries de Paris (1788).  I did not invoke Goupil’s detective work to prove that libels 
were fomenting sedition but rather to reveal the nature of their reception in the capillary 
system of the book trade.  Goupil played up the potentially seditious aspect of La 
Marche’s business in order to ingratiate himself with his superior and to make himself 
look good in comparison with his predecessor as inspecteur de la librairie, Joseph 
d’Hémery.  Far from giving a literal reading of the dossier, I use it to explore the 
ambiguous and tendentious character of police “inspection,” thereby preparing the way 
for a later chapter in which I recount Goupil’s career as an underground publisher of the 
libels he was supposed to confiscate.  I have always treated police archives as texts that   4 
must be read critically
4, but I also believe that one can learn a great deal from them about 
what actually happened 250 years ago.   
  Simon Burrows correctly insists on the importance of studying the temporal as 
well as the social context of readers’ reactions, but he gets my argument wrong.  I noted 
that the most extreme libels about Louis XV appeared after his death.  Presenting 
themselves as histories—histories in the Procopian strain of secret information about the 
private lives of the great—they provided the most important account of the recent past 
that was available to French readers.  Works like Vie privée de Louis XV (1781)—four 
meaty volumes covering the period 1715-1774—made the reign of Louis XV look like an 
age of decadence and despotism, and that message had a moral for French readers living 
under Louis XVI, who could apply it to their own circumstances.  The theme of 
despotism and moral depravity reappeared in later libels, which attacked ministers like 
the controller general Charles-Alexandre de Calonne during the 1780s.  In fact, the 
libelous pamphlets known as Calonniana reworked motifs from the Maupeouana aimed at 
chancellor René Nicolas de Maupeou in the early 1770s.  When the supreme crisis 
paralyzed the French government in 1787-1788, the public needed to make sense of 
events by putting them in historical perspective, and the dominant version of 
contemporary history came from libels.  I am tempted to say that libels provided the only 
version of the recent past, because works about current events, including biographies of 
living public figures, could not be published legally.  To be sure, the regime tolerated 
funeral eulogies and some histories, such as Voltaire’s Le siècle de Louis XV, which 
presented the reign in a favorable light, and it might be possible to construct a counter-
argument by more systematic study.  Although much of The Devil in the Holy Water is 
an attempt to reconstruct the contemporary view of contemporary history, I admit that I 
may have overstated my case; and I hope that this theme will also open up possibilities 
for further research.     
I am surprised that my four critics did not address this argument, which can be 
challenged in various ways.  Instead of confronting it, Simon Burrows asserts that the 
libels against Louis XV had little political impact, because most of them circulated under 
Louis XVI.  He goes so far as to suggest that they served as favorable propaganda for the 
new king, because they provided a negative foil against which he could be contrasted.  
But Burrows cites no evidence for that speculation, which I find unconvincing.  It  
ignores the attempts after 1774 to stamp out every publication that maligned Louis XV, 
his mistresses, and his ministers.  The authorities saw this literature as a retrospective 
form of lèse majesté—that is, as a threat to the monarchy, not as outmoded slander of one 
monarch that could have the happy effect of making another one look good.  
After 1789, of course, conditions changed radically, and libels employed a 
different rhetoric.  In place of the satire and sophisticated word-play that held public 
personages up to ridicule under the ancien régime, they adopted a tone of moral 
indignation.  And instead of revealing secret sex lives, they tore the mask off false 
patriots and exposed what they construed to be a greater crime: economic corruption.  
The shift in tone and themes can be demonstrated, I believe, by surveying the large run of 
libels in a particular genre, the vie privée.   But how to understand the way readers 
reacted to it?  Lacking direct evidence, I fell back on an argument about affinities: the 
change in rhetoric corresponded to the moralistic idiom of revolutionary politics, and it 
was adapted to the cultural horizon of an increasingly plebeian readership.  I can think of   5 
many objections to this interpretation, but Burrows does not confront it.  Instead, he 
advances a counter-argument, which I find more tenuous than mine.  The “key” to libel 
literature after 1789, he claims, is the gendering of the public sphere.  Whether such 
gendering took place is a matter of debate, but I don’t think it should be invoked as an 
established fact that explains the nature of libels and the way they were read.   
 
Politics: Darnton does not do justice to the political context of libels, and he fails to sort 
them out into convincing categories of right vs. left.   
Darrin McMahon rightly emphasizes that slander was no monopoly of writers 
who belonged to the left (if that category has any meaning before 1789), and he suggests 
that some of the sniping could be explained by the attempt of libelers to exploit a growing 
cult of celebrity.  I find that suggestion convincing, especially if the targets among the 
celebrities can be traced to political rivalries.  McMahon’s insight could reinforce one of 
my main arguments—namely, that libels capitalized on the journalistic tendency to 
organize stories around the principle that names make news.  That tendency is especially 
apparent in libels connected with the personal infighting of court politics, and it did not 
disappear during the Revolution, when political groups coalesced around leaders and 
derived their identity from prominent names—Brissotins, Dantonistes, Robespierristes, 
although labels like Feuillants, Girondins, and Montagnards had other derivations.   
I attempted to relate the libels to their political context, but I agree with 
McMahon’s contention that I should have done so in a systematic fashion.  I, too, admire 
the work of Tom Kaiser and Dale Van Kley in this respect, and I am equally impressed 
with McMahon’s own research, especially his fine article on “The Counter-
Enlightenment and the Low-Life of Literature in Pre-Revolutionary France.”  In 
emptying the index cards from my shoe boxes (many of them nearly a half century old), I 
came across a great deal of evidence about connections between pamphleteering and 
political intrigues.  I have published some of this research elsewhere—for example, in an 
essay on Brissot’s financial writings, which shows how they promoted the speculations of 
baissiers on the Bourse and, at the same time, the propaganda offensive against Calonne.  
My last book, Poetry and the Police: Communication Networks in Eighteenth-Century 
France, gives a detailed analysis of how the information that circulated in the streets had 
connections with factional rivalries in Versailles during the mid-century years.  But to 
pursue all the political ramifications of libeling from Louis XIV to Louis XVI was more 
than I could manage.  I hope that other researchers will follow some of those leads, using 
techniques more effective than index cards and shoe boxes. 
Simon Burrows castigates me for advancing an inadequate explanation of the 
Revolution and for trivializing the Enlightenment.  I do not think those criticisms are fair.  
I set out to study the literature of libel, its authors, its themes, its evolution over a century, 
and, insofar as possible, its reception by an increasingly politicized reading public.  Those 
subjects are related to the Enlightenment and the Revolution in various ways, which I 
discussed, but I tried to keep my focus on the subject of my book.  For my views on the 
Enlightenment, I would direct the reader to Pour les Lumières.  Défense, illustration, 
méthode (Bordeaux, 2002), and for a summary of my interpretation of the Revolution, to 
“What Was Revolutionary About the French Revolution,” The New York Review of 
Books, January 19, 1989.   6 
Although I did not pretend to write a history of the Revolution, I did not mean to 
dodge the problem of causality.  Laurent Turcot correctly observes that I understand the 
cumulative effect of the libels as creating a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
the outbreak of the Revolution, and Darrin McMahon raises the possibility that libel 
literature so undermined authority that it might have stifled the liberal propensity of the 
Revolution from the start.  I would not go that far, but in studying the large libel literature 
after 1789, I was struck by the absence of any discussion of principles and policies.  In 
fact, it rarely vilified its victims by exposing unsavory details about the way they 
participated in events.  Even in denouncing conspiracies, the libels did not dig deeply into 
politics.  Instead, they reduced political conflict to the play of personalities and tried to 
reinforce one faction by calumniating the leaders of its enemies.   
Insofar as libelers drew on any general ideas, they invoked the concept of 
despotism.  Montesquieu broke with the Aristotelian categories of political philosophy by 
describing despotism as one of the three basic varieties of government and by 
characterizing them according to their animating principe rather than by the locus of 
power.  In doing so, he opened up an ethnographic vein of political theory, and he 
provided ammunition for libelers.  Yet they made little use of it.  A reader might detect 
an implicit reference to Montesquieu in the libelers’ denunciation of political abuses, and 
he or she might pick up echoes of the protests against despotism in the remonstrances of 
the parlements.  But there is a pervasive, one-note theme to libel literature that raises 
questions.  Whether they are attacking Maupeou or Lafayette, Mme de Maintenon or 
Robespierre, the libelers denounce despotism.  That theme continues unabated from the 
ancien régime to the Terror.  Although it can be explained in part by constant abuses of 
power, I find this continuity curious; for there were many other tendencies to denounce 
after 1789, and they can be found everywhere in revolutionary journalism and oratory—
monopolizing food supplies, consorting with aristocrats, collaborating with the enemy.  
References to these issues crop up occasionally in the libels, but if one stepped back from 
the details and viewed the libels as a whole, the Revolution would appear in black and 
white as a struggle of liberty against despotism. 
I would call this tendency radical simplification, and I would relate it to the 
question of causality as follows:  If the Revolution began in 1787 with a révolte 
nobiliaire, as Georges Lefebvre and others have argued, the aristocratic surge of power 
appears nowhere in the pamphlet literature, including the libels, before August 1788.  The 
anti-aristocratic motif cannot be clearly detected until the Parlement of Paris provided a 
rallying point for reaction on September 25, 1788 by advocating the separation of estates 
in the future Estates General.  Even then and despite the powerful influence of Sieyès’s 
Qu-est-ce que le tiers état, the Revolution appeared primarily as a struggle against 
despotism.  I would not minimize the bourgeois hatred of the aristocracy, the opposition 
of the menu people against les grands, the struggle for bread among the poor, the 
prevalence of counter-revolutionary plots, and the threat of treason in a desperate war—
elements that I try to weave into my account of libel literature after 1789—yet I remain 
struck by the obsession with despotism in libels aligned with every political camp.  What 
could have been less despotic than the ministries of Louis XVI, from Turgot to Brienne, 
or less autocratic than the rule of Louis himself?  Yet they all stood condemned in the 
same way.  “Despotism” was a stick that could be used to beat anyone in authority, and it 
worked so well that it obstructed a clearer view of the revolutionary struggles.  Darrin   7 
McMahon is right: I do not see abstract political discourse as a determinant of events, but 
I think that libels reinforced the illiberalism identified by Isser Woloch in his criticism of 
Furet.  By its very nature, calumny encourages simplification, and simplification prevents 
the successful negotiation of complex conflicts.  The appeal of libel literature was 
visceral, not cerebral.  Histories of the Revolution should take account of that appeal, 
even though historians cannot measure and weigh the responses of revolutionary readers.  
 
Desacralization: Darnton invokes an unproven and unlikely theory to explain the libeling 
of the monarch, which can be accounted for much better in other ways. 
   
Desacralization isn’t a theory at all.  The term merely serves as a way to describe 
a shift in attitude toward the monarchy.  As Marc Bloch, Ernst Kantorowicz, and others 
have demonstrated, a widespread conviction existed among the French from some time 
far back in the Middle Ages that their kings were sacred beings.  Endowed at birth with 
spiritual power, which was reinforced at their coronation, kings could cure disease and 
transform human nature by ennoblement.  Had that belief died out by 1789?  On June 14, 
1775, following his coronation three days earlier—a religious rite of passage performed 
with elaborate attention to symbolic detail-- Louis XVI “touched” 2,400 people afflicted 
with scrofula, “the king’s disease.”  Between that date and the king’s execution as “Louis 
Capet” on January 21, 1793, it seems likely that a profound change occurred in attitudes 
toward royal power among the French.  Lèse-majesté gave way to Lèse-nation.  When, 
how, and how deeply did this change, not just in politics but in world view, take place?  
Although I cannot answer that question, I believe that libels helped to spread a conviction 
that kings were ordinary mortals.  They presented Louis XV in his youth as a feckless, 
clueless “roi fainéant” and in his last years as a dirty old man.  They made Louis XVI out 
to be stupid, impotent, and incompetent.  And in stripping both kings down to their 
deeply flawed humanity, the libels mocked the misuse of their symbolic trapping—the 
scepter, throne, and crown.  It may be impossible to measure the effect of such symbolic 
desecration, but it would be a mistake to ignore it. 
  Although Burrows brings a healthy dose of British empiricism to this subject, he 
shows little tolerance for symbolic and ethnographic modes of interpretation.  In 
criticizing my chapter on “Royal Depravity,” he concentrates on the question of dating 
the libels against Marie-Antoinette.  I dated them correctly, and I did not claim that they 
circulated widely before 1789.  But they used material from oral sources, pamphlets, and 
nouvelles à la main that had been available throughout the pre-revolutionary years.  The 
most widespread attack on the queen, Essais historiques sur la vie de Marie-Antoinette 
d’Autriche (1789, ten later editions), drew on rumors about the queen’s supposed sexual 
depravity, which had circulated in the 1770s and became rampant after the Diamond 
Necklace Affair of 1785.  When Jean-Charles-Pierre Lenoir looked back over his role as 
lieutenant general of police, he noted in a draft of his memoirs that violent talk about the 
queen had increased constantly from 1774 and came to a climax during the Diamond 
Necklace Affair, which he characterized as “une des causes de la Révolution”
5  Libels 
like Les Amours de Charlot et Toinette (1779) expressed calumnies that were already 
circulating in Paris and Versailles.  But the libels of the Revolution went further.  While 
recycling material that had been produced under the ancien régime, they played on hatred 
of “l’Autrichienne” stirred up by conspiracies and war.  And they added so much over-  8 
heated hyperbole that they may well have desecrated whatever aura of the sacred that 
continued to surround Marie-Antoinette after 1789.   
The slander of the queen was so violent that it seems to constitute a genre of its 
own, and one could argue that it did not directly damage the religious attitude toward the 
king, although it certainly made him look despicable.  But the libels against Marie-
Antoinette should be read in the context of an outpouring of slander against all the 
members of the royal family.  The comte d’Artois, the duc d’Orléans, the prince de Conti, 
and the prince de Condé were dragged through the mud in lengthy vies privées of their 
own, which echoed the nastiest passages of Essais historiques sur la vie de Marie-
Antoinette.  The cumulative effect was an elaborate, anti-monarchical mythology 
composed of the same tropes and interlocking themes.  This material can be described as 
part of a general process, the erosion of legitimacy.  Should it also be subsumed under the 
category “desacralization”?  I don’t put much stock in the term and use it sparingly, but I 
think it valid enough, especially if handled with care, as in Jeffry Merrick’s The 
Desacralization of the French Monarchy in the Eighteenth Century.   
 
Grub Street.  Darnton fails once again in an effort to defend his discredited thesis about 
the revolutionary potential of the milieu that he calls Grub Street. 
 
  I did not design The Devil in the Holy Water as a vindication of the argument that 
I published forty years ago.  Grub Street characters figure in my book, which contributes, 
I hope, to a better understanding of authorship in an age when copyright, royalties, and a 
mass reading public did not exist.  Were I to rewrite my first article on Brissot (1968) and 
the essay in Past and Present (1971) that provoked the debate about Grub Street, I would 
change much of the phrasing.  I misled readers by implying unintentionally that a line of 
causality connected the frustrated ambitions of hack writers under the ancien régime to 
the most extreme, Jacobin politics of the Revolution.  That writers suffered from their 
inability to get ahead in a world of letters dominated by an elite seems undeniable to me, 
but the frustrations existed in many camps and led in many directions.  If I look back on 
my own writing about Grub Street, I think I began from the naïve notion that one could 
get inside psyches that had existed centuries ago.  I was influenced by a seminar on 
psychobiography taught by Erik Erikson, where I gave a dubious paper on Brissot’s anti-
monarchical sentiments and the oedipal complex, and also, no doubt, by some of the 
passions unleashed in the 1960s.  I took a more sociological approach in the 1970s, when 
I got to know Pierre Bourdieu and began collaborating with his Actes de la recherche en 
sciences sociales.  Collaboration with Clifford Geertz, which went back to 1970, has had 
a profounder effect on my general approach to history, and my attempts to make use of 
symbolic anthropology have more recently converged with a concern for textual and 
bibliographical analysis as illustrated by the work of Roland Barthes and Donald 
McKenzie.  All these ingredients went into The Devil in the Holy Water, which is not a 
treatise on Grub Street. 
  The criticism of the Grub Street sub-theme of my book clusters around three 
subjects: the economic condition of writers in the eighteenth century, the “demography” 
or size of the writing population, and the sociology of authorship.   
  I agree with Geoffrey Turnovsky’s argument about the importance of 
distinguishing between direct and indirect sources of support for writers and of allowing   9 
for the discursive character of the evidence.  But the fact that writers discoursed about 
poverty does not mean that poverty should be ruled out as a fact.  In combing through 
500 police reports about writers in Paris from 1748 to 1752, I came upon many cases of 
poor devils who lived like Voltaire’s Pauvre diable.
6  Although the reports conform to the 
conventions of police discourse,
7 they contain plenty of evidence that writers had 
difficulty in clothing their families, paying the rent, and getting bread on the table.  I 
think of J.-C. Soulas d’Allainval, who could not afford to buy paper in order to continue 
writing libels and retreated to the Hôtel Dieu to die as a pauper—or even Jacques-Pierre 
Brissot, described by Filippo Mazzei as living miserably in two rooms with a large 
family, his children dressed in “rags.”  Brissot’s close friend Jérôme Pétion confirmed 
that view of his poverty on the eve of the Revolution: “Il était impossible d’être plus 
simple dans sa parure, d’avoir des appartements moins recherchés, d’avoir une table plus 
frugale et de faire enfin moins de dépenses….Souvent Brissot n’avait pas six francs dans 
sa poche, il était oblige de faire à chaque instant de petits emprunts à ses amis….”
8   
Having discussed Brissot’s case at length in a biographical study and an edition of 
his correspondence,
9 I won’t go over it once again here.  But I would like to address a 
point raised by Simon Burrows as well as Turnovsky.  Both insist that there is no 
incompatibility between poverty and commitment to idealistic principles.  I agree.  I 
believe that Brissot had a genuine faith in the ideals of the Enlightenment from the 
beginning to the end of his career.  Far from disparaging him for bad faith, I tried to show 
how he clung to his principles even in the Rousseauistic arguments of the pamphlets that 
he wrote to promote Clavière’s speculations on the Bourse.  I was shocked in 1965 when 
I read in Lenoir’s papers that Brissot was paid to spy for the police.  Although I noted 
that “spying” could have involved writing relatively innocent reports about other authors 
and their works, I produced a harsh account of Brissot’s compromises with the authorities 
of the ancien régime.  Many years ago when I asked to consult his private papers in the 
Archives Nationales, I was refused permission.  Now that I have had the opportunity to 
study them, I am impressed with Brissot’s steadfastness under questioning in the Bastille.  
And having read similar material about compromises made by authors in Communist 
East Germany, I feel no desire to point an accusing finger.  Who am I, a well-fed, well-
paid historian writing in the comfort of a Harvard office, to disparage the reputation of 
writers who lived centuries ago?  My purpose, however, was not to pass judgment on the 
integrity of authors but rather to understand how they coped with the conditions of 
authorship. 
One approach to that problem is to calculate the growth of the population of 
writers from 1750 to 1789.  By way of illustration, I quoted Mercier’s remark that France 
contained an immense number of writers but only thirty persons who actually made a 
career of writing.  Geoffrey Turnovsky rightly warns that Mercier meant to exalt the 
dignity of the small minority who were genuinely committed to literature as a vocation.  
Although I agree, I think that Mercier was also reflecting on the difficulty of living from 
the pen.  But I did not base my argument on Mercier’s remark.  I worked systematically 
through several sources to calculate the growth in the number of writers.  Aside from 
police reports and the surprisingly accurate information in Rivarol’s tendentious Le Petit 
Almanach de nos grands hommes (1788), I based my estimates on successive editions of 
La France littéraire, a publication that claimed to include a notice on every existing 
French writer.  It defined a writer as someone who has published at least one book—an   10 
arbitrary measure but one that has the advantage of eliminating those who published only 
some frothy poetry in the Mercure or Année littéraire.  I concluded that the population 
grew from 1,187 in 1757 to 2,819 in 1784, although the number by 1789 was probably 
greater than 3,000.
10  Those statistics may not qualify as a contribution to a rigorous 
demography, but they prove my point about the overgrowth of writers relative to the 
under supply of employment in occupations connected with literature.  It was this 
demographic pressure—too many competitors, too few sources of support—that made 
life so hard for those who drifted downward into the milieu that I call Grub Street. 
The term is metaphorical or, if one prefers, metonymical.  It does not express a 
theory, as Simon Burrows claims, any more than “desacralization” conveys theoretical 
reflection.  But it does describe a subject of research that can be considered 
sociological—or, more properly, prosopographical.  I understand the milieu of Grub 
Street to be a sector in the “field” of literature (to use Pierre Bourdieu’s terminology) that 
was constituted by power relations in the eighteenth century.  The writers who belonged 
to it did not come from a specific social group.  They were not exclusively provincial 
bourgeois who sought fame and fortune in Paris, only to sink to the bottom of the literary 
world, seething with frustration.  Some of their careers fit into that pattern—Pierre 
Manuel’s, for example, which I discuss at length in The Devil in the Holy Water.  But 
Grub Street included writers who came from many different backgrounds—doctors and 
lawyers, defrocked priests, déclassé aristocrats, and adventurers of all stripes.  Anne 
Gédéon Lafitte, marquis de Pelleport, exemplifies the latter.  I do not consider him a 
genius, but I think his Bohémiens warrants careful study, not only for its literary brio, but 
also for its revelations about the experience of literary life at the bottom of “literature” in 
the sociological sense of the word.  My early attempts to write literary history from the 
bottom up, inspired in part by the social history of the 1960s, did not take adequate 
account of the middle ranks of writers, men (rarely women) who made a decent living as 
tutors, secretaries, and abbés.  Were I to rewrite those publications today, I would make 
use of the concepts and methods developed in subaltern studies.  But I would not revise 
my basic argument that, at bottom, the literary world was composed of impoverished 
hacks, who took on all sorts of odd jobs, notably libeling, in a struggle to survive. 
How to make sociological sense of all this disparate human material?  I never 
attempted to write a full-scale social history of Grub Street, Paris, although I believe it 
could be done by taking cues from Pat Rogers’s admirable study of Grub Street, London.  
The London milieu of French expatriate writers affords an opportunity to experiment 
with some comparative analysis on a microscopic scale: hence my focus on the libelers of 
London in the first two parts of The Devil in the Holy Water.  After many years of 
research in police archives and the papers of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I 
thought I had gathered enough material to portray that milieu.  I did not think it adequate, 
however, to attempt anything like a prosopography or collective biography. 
  Simon Burrows did not feel inhibited by such doubts.  Thanks to painstaking 
research, he turned up some new documentation and extended the story further than the 
fundamental work of Gunnar and Mavis von Proschwitz.
11  But the most original aspect 
of his Blackmail, Scandal, and Revolution.  London’s French libellistes, 1758-92 is its 
claim to provide a rigorous, prosopographical analysis of the London libelers as a group.  
While developing this argument, Burrows disparaged my work as misconceived, 
teleological, and exemplary of the flaws inherent in a supposed “Darntonesque,   11 
‘pornographic school.’”
12  I could not recognize any of my own ideas in his remarks 
about a “Darntonian model,” a “Darntonian assumption”, and “classic Grub Street 
theory.”
13  Nor did I consider it fair to attribute arguments to me through the use of 
phrases such as: “Certainly Darnton would argue…” and “As Darnton would have it…”
14  
Because I had never taken those positions and would never have argued in the ways he 
invents, I concluded that Burrows was tilting at a straw man of his own making.   
  The anti-“Darntonian” rhetoric may not be important, but Burrows’s attempt to 
reconstruct the world of the London libelers deserves serious consideration.  Although he 
gives an accurate picture of their activities as far as they can be known, he does not 
produce enough evidence about their backgrounds to support any general conclusions.  
He identifies sixteen libelers.  Of them, he has virtually no information about three: 
Lenoir de La Bussière, Campagnol, and Dom Louis.  He fails to identify any writing by 
two others, Linsing and Vignoles, who may never have written anything.  Of the 
remaining eleven, Jacquet de la Douai, the police agent, must be eliminated, although he 
was deeply involved in libeling, because he made only a few forays into London from his 
home base in Paris.  Simon Nicolas Henri Linguet might at a stretch be considered a 
libeler, owing to his constant polemics and his vitriolic Théorie du libelle.  But he was 
primarily a journalist and a pamphleteer, who unlike true libelers did not hide in 
anonymity, and during his relatively short stay in London he had little contact with the 
hack writers who clustered around Le Courier de l’Europe.  To classify the chevalier 
d’Eon as a libeler is more of a stretch, because his involvement in the secret du roi did 
not involve slandering, and his Lettres, mémoires, et négociations particulières du 
chevalier d’Eon is an idiosyncratic account of his baroque imbroglios, not a libel, despite 
its nasty remarks about the comte de Guerchy.  It is a great stretch indeed to include the 
comte and comtesse de La Motte among the libelers, because they were not writers.  The 
libels that appeared under their names were written for them by others and were 
published in 1789—that is, after the literary world of the ancien régime had been 
transformed and writers worked under new conditions.  The ghost writers of the La Motte 
couple, Joseph Parkyns (or Perkins) MacMahon and Antoine Joseph de Serres de La 
Tour, occupied key positions in the expatriate colony, but there is no evidence that they 
wrote any libels before 1789.  Of those that remain from Burrows’s survey, Morande, 
Pelleport, and Pillement de Fauques certainly qualify as libelers, and Treyssac de Vergy 
might be considered as a would-be libeler, although he seems never to have actually 
published anything.  Therefore, if examined closely, Burrows’s population of sixteen, can 
be reduced to three or four.  And even if the ambiguous or undocumented cases are 
classified with the well-known libelers, the statistical base of Burrows’s argument 
remains trivial.  
  Serious prosopography, the kind developed by Ronald Syme and Lewis Namier, 
requires enough of a quantitative foundation for the historian to sustain an argument 
about the social composition of the group under study.  Burrows’s interpretation, as far as 
it goes, seems valid to me.  Scattered and scarce as they are, the sources suggest that the 
expatriate libelers in London came from different backgrounds but had two things in 
common: they needed to make money, and they were adventurers.  Some of them also 
had principles—even Pelleport, whose literary projects included an attempt to translate 
the radical works of  Catherine Macaulay.  I have doubts about the high-mindedness of 
Morande, whom Burrows treats as a “patriot.”  Although Morande’s attacks on   12 
“despotism” could seem to align him with the opponents of Maupeou in the 1770s and of 
Calonne and Brienne in the 1780s, I find it hard to credit him with any idealism.  Instead, 
I view him as the self-styled “Philosophe Cynique,” who appears on the title page of Le 
Gazetier cuirassé and who would do anything for money—gambling, pimping, libeling, 
blackmailing, and spying for the police.  My assessment may be wrong, but it is 
compatible with one of Burrows’s basic points: Morande was above all an adventurer, 
and in that respect he epitomized the way of life of the libelers in London. 
  It could be, therefore, that Burrows and I do not differ fundamentally in our views 
of the London libelers.  But my view should not be misconstrued.  I never characterized 
the inhabitants of Grub Street, either in London or in Paris, as a population composed 
exclusively of young writers who had failed to make it to the top of the literary world and 
vented their frustrations from positions at the bottom.  Nor did I describe their passions as 
a cause of Jacobinism.  Whatever unfortunate terms I employed nearly fifty years ago—
and I would happily sacrifice “nihilistic”—I did not base my argument on psychological 
reductionism or simple-minded causality.   
  Having devoted so much of The Devil in the Holy Water to rhetoric, I can see in 
retrospect that the rhetorical thrust of my own writings has led to misreadings.  But 
misreadings occupy an important place in the history of books, and they are often 
constructive, especially if they provoke debate.  I want to thank H-France Forum for 
arranging this debate; and far from wanting to have the last word, I hope it will continue. 
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